Another regiment able to fly well the MiG-3 was the 55 IAP on the Southern Front; it was the unit of the future Hero of the Soviet Union Alexander Pokryshkin, that obtained his  first 12 victories on a MiG-3; of these, 5 were on Bf-109E of Jagdgeschwader 77.
He was one of the first pilots to understand that the good manoeuvrability of the MiG-3 on the vertical plan should be exploited flying high, then diving on the enemy gaining speed, use it to choose a good firing position, fire and then pitch to regain altitude and to subtract to the reaction of the enemy.

MiG-3s were slightly more manoeuvrable than Bf-109E on the vertical plane, even at low altitudes that were disadvantaging for the Soviet fighter. This technique was used by German themselves while combatting against Polish PZL-11 two years before: the slow and highly manoeuvrable Polish fighters took advantage to combat turning, until the Me-109s started to jump on them from above.
The combat on the horizontal plan was a natural choice for one using a slow and manoeuvrable aircraft as an I-16 or a biplane, and wasn't a guarantee against a diving Messerschmitt. To fly a MiG-3 as it was an I-16, turning on horizontal plan, was wrong against Bf-109E, that was able to turn with a 25% lower turning radius due to its lower wing load.
At higher altitudes, between 5,000 and 7,000 m, the MiG-3 was superior both on speed and manoeuvrability to the Bf-109E, and was comparable to the Bf-109F, but combat at such altitudes were rare on the Soviet-German front.

Many defects were noted during operative use, alongside the already known weak armament, tendency to spin, longitudinal instability and high landing speed:

• sliding canopy difficult to open at speeds over 400 km/h, and this led pilots to usually fly with the canopy open, that reduced the MiG-3's speed by 30 km/h;
• landing gear often failing to extend, and easy to be damaged during landing;
• difficulty to repair damages to the carburettor duct after a belly landing; this could stop to the ground the aircraft for a long time for repair;
• difficulty to repair internal structures of the rear fuselage, because the stabilizator was solidal to them and limited their accessibility;
• unsatisfactory view, particularly during takeoff and landing, due to the long nose and strongly nose-up asset on the ground;
• some splashing of oil on the windscreen reduced the visibility;
• high cockpit temperature due to the ventral cooleer;
• fumes and, eventually fuel vapors in the cockpit;
• lack of a fuel flow indicator;
• low range, particularly with canopy opened, that reduced its utility as a reconaissance plane.

• When Barbarossa started, the typical Soviet combat section was composed by 3 aircraft, one leader and 2 wingmen flying on either side of it. This made combat maneuvering difficult, with the aircraft impeding each other. Pokryshkin hated that system and complained a lot of times about the order to fly in a 3 ship formation according to combat regulations. After a lot of trouble with that kind of formation, the Soviets changed to the German-style formation of 2 aircraft only, which was introduced by Werner Mölders during the Spanish Civil war.
• Pokryshkin realized rightly that he had to utilize vertical combat while flying the MiG against a Messerschmitt, instead of the horizontal combat typical of flying an I-16 or an I-153. Pokryshkin realized that the vertical maneuver is always the attacking maneuver of the faster and heavier aircraft, whereas the horizontal maneuver is always the defending maneuver of the slower and lighter aircraft. So the hunter should always fly a faster, even if heavier, aircraft. The faster aircraft can choose to fight or not. This was hard to learn for Soviet pilots that where used to fly Polikarpovs for most of their flying career. But Pokryshkin did and this was the reason he was successful in the MiG.

That sound just too easy, but the main task of the VVS was to support the ground troops and that means for the fighters to protect the ground troops of enemy’s air attacks.   The normal way was to fly a combat circle over the area to protect.  This was good in a psychological way for the ground troops. Looking above the troops seeing there own fighters all the time:   ”Da, Da, there are our fighters, protecting us.”  But it was not good at all, because the German method was to send the Messerschmitts first to clean the airspace for the following bombers and that means they were coming from above shooting down circling Russian fighters. 

Pokryshkin used his basical physics knowledge about transforming potential energy into kinetic energy and vice versa. So they stopped flying circles over the area to protect and flew instead like a big pendulum over the area, having either altitude or speed all the time. This was not good in a psychological way for the ground troops seeing their fighters only when they reached the lowest point ( “Hey! Where are our fighters?") but of course much better in any other respect. Pokryshkin’s unit used that combat tactic first during the fights over Krymskaja and they did it with great success. This formula of victory was published in the Soviet army newspaper “Krasnaja Zvezda” (Red Star), so that the new combat experiences could be distributed all over the front.
 

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